2025/11/07 by Nakada, Satoshi, Nakamura, Kensei
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.05019
openalex publication_date 2025/11/07 · openalex created_date 2025/11/11 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash, 1950). Our main result shows that these solutions can be characterized by new rationality axioms for choice correspondences, which are modifications of Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (or more precisely, Arrow's (1959) choice axiom), when combined with standard axioms.