2018/11/04 by Shuige Liu, Liu, Shuige
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Economic theories and models
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1811.01933
We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory:\npermissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define\nthe lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based\non it, we give two groups of characterizations. The first group characterizes\npermissibility and proper rationalizability. The second group characterizes\npermissibility in an alternative way and iterated admissibility. In each group,\nthe conditions for the latter are stronger than those for the former, which\ncorresponds to the fact that proper rationalizability and iterated\nadmissibility are two (compatible) refinements of permissibility within the\ncomplete information framework. The intrinsic difference between the two groups\nare the role of rationality: the first group does not need it, while the second\ngroup does.\n