2024/07/18 by Sunny, Ani, Nivedita Shrivastava, Smruti R. Sarangi +2
Computer Science · #Cloud Data Security Solutions #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Distributed systems and fault tolerance #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Hardware Architecture (cs.AR) #Security and Verification in Computing
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.13572
openalex publication_date 2024/07/18 · openalex created_date 2025/01/04 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly announced its plans to deprecate its most trustworthy enclave, SGX, on its 11th and 12th generation processors. The reasons stemmed from the fact that it was difficult to scale the enclaves (sandboxes) beyond 256 MB as the hardware overheads outweighed the benefits. Competing solutions by Intel and other vendors are much more scalable, but do not provide many key security guarantees that SGX used to provide notably replay attack protection. In the last three years, no proposal from industry or academia has been able to provide both scalability (with a modest slowdown) as well as replay-protection on generic hardware (to the best of our knowledge). We solve this problem by proposing SecScale that uses some new ideas centered around speculative execution (read first, verify later), creating a forest of MACs (instead of a tree of counters) and providing complete memory encryption (no generic unsecure regions). We show that we are 10% faster than the nearest competing alternative.