2025/11/28 by Galina Weinstein, Weinstein, Galina
Physics and Astronomy · #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Relativity and Gravitational Theory #Noncommutative and Quantum Gravity Theories
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2511.23125
Einstein's 1935 critique of quantum mechanics is often associated with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument, yet his private correspondence from that year reveals a more exact conceptual structure guiding his claim that the ψ-function is incomplete. This paper reconstructs Einstein's reasoning in his letters to Schrödinger and Popper and examines how it engages, and fails to engage with contemporary ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinctions. Recent scholarship, most notably by Ben-Menahem, has interpreted Einstein as an early representative of the modern ψ-epistemic tradition within the Harrigan-Spekkens ontological models framework and the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem. I argue, however, that this retrospective classification is undermined by Ben-Menahem's own distinction between realist and radical epistemic interpretations: Einstein's 1935 view lacks the structural assumptions - defined ontic state space, preparation distributions, and overlap structure - required for membership in the HS/PBR class of ψ-epistemic models. Any such identification, therefore, requires importing formal machinery foreign to Einstein's original argument.