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Competing Bandits in Matching Markets via Super Stability

2025/06/19 by Basu, Soumya
Decision Sciences · #Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Machine Learning (cs.LG)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.15926

openalex publication_date 2025/06/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We study bandit learning in matching markets with two-sided reward uncertainty, extending prior research primarily focused on single-sided uncertainty. Leveraging the concept of `super-stability' from Irving (1994), we demonstrate the advantage of the Extended Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm over the standard GS algorithm in achieving true stable matchings under incomplete information. By employing the Extended GS algorithm, our centralized algorithm attains a logarithmic pessimal stable regret dependent on an instance-dependent admissible gap parameter. This algorithm is further adapted to a decentralized setting with a constant regret increase. Finally, we establish a novel centralized instance-dependent lower bound for binary stable regret, elucidating the roles of the admissible gap and super-stable matching in characterizing the complexity of stable matching with bandit feedback.

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