2019/11/05 by Jiří V. Outrata, Outrata, Jiří V., Jan Valdman +1
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Economic theories and models #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Optimization and Variational Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1911.01841
openalex publication_date 2019/11/05 · openalex created_date 2022/07/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The paper deals with a class of parametrized equilibrium problems, where the\nobjectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash\nequilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational\ninequality of the second kind, whose Lipschitzian stability is thoroughly\ninvestigated. This theory is then applied to evolution of a oligopolistic\nmarket in which the firms adopt their production strategies to changing input\ncosts, while each change of the production is associated with some "costs of\nchange". We examine both the Cournot-Nash equilibria as well as the two-level\ncase, when one firm decides to take over the role of the Leader (Stackelberg\nequilibrium). The impact of costs of change is illustrated by academic\nexamples.\n