Feasibility of Randomized Detector Tuning for Attack Impact Mitigation

2025/03/14 by Anand, Sribalaji C., Hassan, Kamil, Sandberg, Henrik · 1 citation
#FOS: Electrical engineering #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2503.11417

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being stealthy. To minimize the impact of stealthy attacks, inspired by moving target defense, the operator randomly switches the detector thresholds. In this paper, we theoretically derive the sufficient (and in some cases necessary) conditions under which the impact of stealthy attacks can be made smaller with randomized switching of detector thresholds compared to static thresholds. We establish the conditions for the stateless (χ²) and the stateful (CUSUM) detectors. The results are illustrated through numerical examples.

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