2024/08/09 by Matthews, Paul R.
Arts and Humanities · #Consciousness #Habit #Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations #Organism #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Philosophy and Historical Thought #Self #Soul
paper · doi:10.48548/pubdata-2499
openalex publication_date 2024/08/09 · openalex created_date 2025/11/08 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/01
In this essay, I offer a corrective to the standard reading of Hegel as a social constructivist when it comes to matters of the self by shifting the focus from the Phenomenology to his ‘Philosophy of Spirit’ and ‘Anthropology.’ There, a kind-of self or Selbstischkeit is revealed, anticipating the pre-reflective, experiential of the likes of Zahavi and, by extension, Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Hegel's conception of the self enhances our understanding of the relationship between the pre-reflective, experiential self and the self of self-consciousness, contributing to the discourse on the continuity between biological and mental life. The self, as it emerges in consciousness, traces its origins to a primarily bodily selfness which is foundational to psychical life. Habit emerges as a vital bridge between this selfness and the self of self-consciousness, offering a dynamic, dialectical framework for thinking the development of the self of self-consciousness in and out of its bodily context.