Political Conditions for Electoral Accountability in Federalism

2017/08/14 by Fred Cutler · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Systems and Governance #Policy Transfer and Learning

paper · doi:10.1017/s0008423917000282

Abstract

Abstract A theory of voting under federalism requires that attributions of responsibility moderate the strength of retrospective voting. Scholars have spotty evidence that voters do this but put this down to the effects of institutions and citizens’ capabilities. I show that political variation also affects electoral accountability. Using panel surveys across provincial and federal elections and qualitative media content analysis, I show that voters only live up to a federal theory of voting when governments make policy changes independent of the other level and those changes and their consequences are prominent in political discourse. Federal institutions affect electoral accountability through the politics that they generate.

Citations

• Clarity of Responsibility Beyond the Pocketbook: How Political Institutions Condition EU Issue Voting
• Who’s in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union

Cited by

• Do Men and Women Differ in their Political Knowledge about Policy Responsibilities across Levels of Government?
• European Blame Games

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