2017/08/14 by Fred Cutler · 19 citations
Psychology · Social Sciences · #Accountability #Attribution #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Federalism #Law #Policy Transfer and Learning #Political Systems and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Psychology #Public administration #Social psychology #Variation (astronomy) #Voting #Voting behavior
paper · doi:10.1017/s0008423917000282
published in Canadian Journal of Political Science 50(4), 1037-1059 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2017/08/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Abstract A theory of voting under federalism requires that attributions of responsibility moderate the strength of retrospective voting. Scholars have spotty evidence that voters do this but put this down to the effects of institutions and citizens’ capabilities. I show that political variation also affects electoral accountability. Using panel surveys across provincial and federal elections and qualitative media content analysis, I show that voters only live up to a federal theory of voting when governments make policy changes independent of the other level and those changes and their consequences are prominent in political discourse. Federal institutions affect electoral accountability through the politics that they generate.