2001/09/24 by G. Anandalingam, Anandalingam, G.
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computers and Society (cs.CY) #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #FOS: Computer and information sciences #K.4.m Miscellaneous #Supply Chain and Inventory Management #cs.CY
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0109065
29th TPRC Conference, 2001
arxiv created 2001/09/24 · openalex publication_date 2001/09/24 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper, we assess the applicability of auctions based on the Vickrey second price model for allocating wireless spectrum in developing countries. We first provide an overview of auction models for allocating resources. We then examine the experience of auctioning spectrum in different countries. Based on this examination, we posit some axioms that seem to have to be satisfied when allocating spectrum in most developing countries. In light of these axioms, we provide a critical evaluation of using Vickrey second- price auctions to allocate spectrum in developing countries. We suggest the use of a new auction mechanism, the Vickrey "share auction" which will satisfy many of these axioms.