Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

2018/05/29 by Couvreur, Alain, Lequesne, Matthieu, Tillich, Jean-Pierre
#Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Information Theory (cs.IT)

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1805.11489

Abstract

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

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