2018/02/02 by James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland · 40 citations
Social Sciences · #Adverse selection #Corruption and Economic Development #Democracy #Economics #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Law #Microeconomics #Order (exchange) #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Transparency (behavior)
paper · doi:10.1017/s0007123417000308
published in British Journal of Political Science 49(4), 1251-1277 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/02/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.