The Significance of Non-Empirical Confirmation in Fundamental Physics

2017/02/03 by Richard Dawid, Dawid, Richard · 3 citations
Arts and Humanities · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Physical sciences #History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph) #Philosophy and History of Science #Quantum Mechanics and Applications

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1702.01133

openalex publication_date 2017/02/03 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In the absence of empirical confirmation, scientists may judge a theory's chances of being viable based on a wide range of arguments. The paper argues that such arguments can differ substantially with regard to their structural similarly to empirical confirmation. Arguments that resemble empirical confirmation in a number of crucial respects provide a better basis for reliable judgement and can, in a Bayesian sense, amount to significant non-empirical confirmation. It is shown that three kinds of non-empirical confirmation that have been specified in earlier work do satisfy those conditions.

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• Evidential Reconfiguration as Bayesian Confirmation For Dark Matter in 1974: How Existing Data Become Evidence in New Structures
• Dark Matter Realism: How Referential Semantics Restricts Realism in Contemporary Fundamental Physics
• Holistic Versus Fragmented Multiverses: Empirical Access via Causal and Grounding Signatures

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