2003/10/11 by Paweł Sobkowicz, Pawel Sobkowicz, Sobkowicz, Pawel
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Medicine · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Disordered Systems and Neural Networks (cond-mat.dis-nn) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #FOS: Biological sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE) #cond-mat.dis-nn #q-bio.PE
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cond-mat/0310266
19 pages, 8 figures
arxiv created 2003/10/11 · openalex publication_date 2003/10/11 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) is provided by the so called Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we present several enhancements to the model aimed at describing the evolution of cooperative behavior. In addition to Doves and Hawks we introduce several groups of Cooperators, who act as Doves within their own group, but as Hawks outside it. This allows to study how cooperating groups may grow and achieve stability within a nonrepeating evolutionary games framework. Depending on initial conditions, the final stable population may have one, all-encompassing Cooperator population or several competing cliques. After taking into account that Cooperators bear costs necessary to recognize members of one's own group it is possible to see populations where Cooperators eventually lose against Hawks or populations where several cliques of Cooperators coexist with a Hawk population.