2019/01/10 by Tesnim Naceur, Naceur, Tesnim, Yézékaël Hayel +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Engineering · Health Professions · #Advanced Queuing Theory Analysis #Advanced Wireless Network Optimization #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Healthcare Operations and Scheduling Optimization #Optimization and Control (math.OC)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1901.03115
openalex publication_date 2019/01/10 · openalex created_date 2022/07/30 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex\nthan those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study\ncustomers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers\nhave to choose between two strategic decisions about information acquisition\nbefore joining or not the queue. According to their decision, customers decide\nto give up the service (balk the system) or to join the queue. We study the\nNash equilibrium strategies: we compute the equilibrium and we prove its\nexistence and uniqueness. Based on this result, we consider the problem of\nrevenue maximization where the provider has to choose between two charging\nmechanisms: to charge the access to the system or to charge the queue length\ninformation to new incoming customers. We propose an heuristic algorithm to\nsolve the considered problem and numerical experiments have been conducted in\norder to illustrate the result. We show that, depending on the sensitivity of\ncustomers to their waiting time, the provider will change the pricing policy\nused. Particularly, when customers are more sensitive then the provider will\ncharge the information instead of the access.\n