2017/11/13 by Treust, Maël Le, Tristan Tomala, Tomala, Tristan
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Information Theory (cs.IT) #Optimization and Control (math.OC)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1711.04492
openalex created_date 2017/09/15 · openalex publication_date 2017/11/13 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run utility functions. The topology of the point-to-point network under investigation, suggests that the decoder implements a strategy, knowing in advance the strategy of the encoder. We characterize the encoding and decoding functions that form an equilibrium, by using empirical coordination. The equilibrium solution is related to an auxiliary game in which both players choose some conditional distributions in order to maximize their expected utilities. This problem is closely related to the literature on "Information Design" in Game Theory. We also characterize the set of posterior distributions that are compatible with a rate-limited channel between the encoder and the decoder. Finally, we provide an example of non-aligned utility functions corresponding to parallel fading multiple access channels.