2010/11/23 by Anne Broadbent, Broadbent, Anne, Stacey Jeffery +3
Computer Science · #Cryptography and Data Security #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting #Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1011.5242
We present three voting protocols with unconditional privacy and correctness,\nwithout assuming any bound on the number of corrupt participants. All protocols\nhave polynomial complexity and require private channels and a simultaneous\nbroadcast channel. Unlike previously proposed protocols in this model, the\nprotocols that we present deterministically output the exact tally. Our first\nprotocol is a basic voting scheme which allows voters to interact in order to\ncompute the tally. Privacy of the ballot is unconditional in the sense that\nregardless of the behavior of the dishonest participants nothing can be learned\nthrough the protocol that could not be learned in an ideal realisation.\nUnfortunately, a single dishonest participant can make the protocol abort, in\nwhich case the dishonest participants can nevertheless learn the outcome of the\ntally. Our second protocol introduces voting authorities which improves the\ncommunication complexity by limiting interaction to be only between voters and\nauthorities and among the authorities themselves; the simultaneous broadcast is\nalso limited to the authorities. In the second protocol, as long as a single\nauthority is honest, the privacy is unconditional, however, a single corrupt\nauthority or a single corrupt voter can cause the protocol to abort. Our final\nprotocol provides a safeguard against corrupt voters by enabling a verification\ntechnique to allow the authorities to revoke incorrect votes without aborting\nthe protocol. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a simultaneous\nbroadcast channel with the use of temporary computational assumptions, yielding\nversions of our protocols that achieve everlasting security.\n