2018/08/10 by Alexander Bird · 124 citations
Arts and Humanities · Decision Sciences · Mathematics · Medicine · Psychology · #Actuarial science #Biology #Commit #Computer science #Econometrics #Economics #Epistemology #Fallacy #Falsifiability #Incentive #Mathematical economics #Medicine #Meta-analysis and systematic reviews #Microeconomics #Null hypothesis #Outcome (game theory) #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Positive economics #Psychology #Replicate #Replication (statistics) #Social psychology #Statistical Methods in Clinical Trials #Statistical hypothesis testing #Statistics #Test (biology)
paper · open access · doi:10.1093/bjps/axy051
published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72(4), 965-993 (Oxford University Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/08/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
The replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis in social psychology and clinical medicine arises from the fact that many apparently well-confirmed experimental results are subsequently overturned by studies that aim to replicate the original study. The culprit is widely held to be poor science: questionable research practices, failure to publish negative results, bad incentives, and even fraud. In this article I argue that the high rate of failed replications is consistent with high-quality science. We would expect this outcome if the field of science in question produces a high proportion of false hypotheses prior to testing. If most of the hypotheses under test are false, then there will be many false hypotheses that are apparently supported by the outcomes of well conducted experiments and null hypothesis significance tests with a type-I error rate (α) of 5%. Failure to recognize this is to commit the fallacy of ignoring the base rate. I argue that this is a plausible diagnosis of the replication crisis and examine what lessons we thereby learn for the future conduct of science.