2018/07/14 by Jason Winning · 2 citations
Arts and Humanities · Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Environmental Science · #Philosophy and History of Science #Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies #Science and Climate Studies
paper · doi:10.1093/bjps/axy042
Any successful account of the metaphysics of mechanistic causation must satisfy at least five key desiderata. In this article, I lay out these five desiderata and explain why existing accounts of the metaphysics of mechanistic causation fail to satisfy them. I then present an alternative account that does satisfy the five desiderata. According to this alternative account, we must resort to a type of ontological entity that is new to metaphysics, but not to science: constraints. In this article, I explain how a constraints-based metaphysics fits best with the emerging consensus on the nature of mechanistic explanation. 1. Introduction2. Renormalizability2.1. The first two desiderata: Intrinsicness and productivity2.2. The third desideratum: Scientific validity or non-mysteriousness2.3. The fourth desideratum: Directionality2.4. The fifth desideratum: Perspectival nature of mechanisms3. Constraints and Causation3.1. Multi-perspectival realism and causal structure3.2. Causal structure as laws3.3. Causal structures in analytical mechanics: Constraints3.4. A metaphysics inspired by analytical mechanics: Constraints as ontologically primitive modal structures4. Constraints and Mechanistic Causal Powers 4.1. Inter- versus intra-perspectival categories4.2. Mechanistic causal powers are grounded by constraints4.3. Intrinsicness and constraints4.4. Constraints and productiveness4.5. Constraints and directionality5. Conclusion