Generalizing the Lottery Paradox

2006/12/01 by Igor Douven, Timothy Williamson · 111 citations
Arts and Humanities · Decision Sciences · Mathematics · Medicine · #Argument (complex analysis) #Calculus (dental) #Class (philosophy) #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Epistemology #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Lottery #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Medicine #Philosophy #Philosophy and History of Science #Statistics

paper · doi:10.1093/bjps/axl022

published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57(4), 755-779 (Oxford University Press)

openalex publication_date 2006/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. 1. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox2. The argument generalized3. Some variations4. Adding modalities5. Anticipated objections

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