2022/05/07 by Hara, Konan, Ito, Yuki, Koh, Paul
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Decision Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Econometrics (econ.EM) #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Receptor Mechanisms and Signaling
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.03706
openalex publication_date 2022/05/07 · openalex created_date 2022/05/22 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/02
We develop an empirical framework for analyzing dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the analyst. We introduce Markov correlated equilibrium, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium, and show that its predictions coincide with the Markov perfect equilibrium predictions attainable when players observe richer signals than the analyst assumes. We provide tractable methods for informationally robust estimation, inference, and counterfactual analysis. We illustrate the framework with a dynamic entry game between Starbucks and Dunkin' in the US and study the role of informational assumptions.