False Data Injection Attacks on Phasor Measurements That Bypass Low-rank Decomposition

2017/05/04 by Jiazi Zhang, Zhigang Chu, Zhang, Jiazi +5
Engineering · #FOS: Electrical engineering #Power System Optimization and Stability #Power Systems Fault Detection #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1705.02038

openalex publication_date 2017/05/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.

Citations

• Evaluating Power System Vulnerability to False Data Injection Attacks via Scalable Optimization

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