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Novel market approach for locally balancing renewable energy production\n and flexible demand

2017/11/27 by José Horta, Horta, José, Daniel Kofman +5
Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #Smart Grid Energy Management #Transportation and Mobility Innovations

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1711.09565

openalex publication_date 2017/11/27 · openalex created_date 2022/10/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of\nvariable renewable energy sources and local storage resources. Moreover, they\nwill face new load structures due for example to the growth of the electric\nvehicle market. These trends raise the need for new paradigms for distribution\ngrids operation, in which Distribution System Operators will increasingly rely\non demand side flexibility and households will progressively become prosumers\nplaying an active role on smart grid energy management. However, in present\nenergy management architectures, the lack of coordination among actors limits\nthe capability of the grid to enable the mentioned trends. In this paper we\ntackle this problem by proposing an architecture that enables households to\nautonomously exchange energy blocks and flexibility services with neighbors,\noperators and market actors. The solution is based on a blockchain transactive\nplatform. We focus on a market application, where households can trade energy\nwith their neighbors, aimed to locally balancing renewable energy production.\nWe propose a market mechanism and dynamic transport prices that provide an\nincentive for households to locally manage energy resources in a way that\nresponds to both pro-sumer and operator needs. We evaluate the impact of such\nmarkets through comprehensive simulations using power flow analysis and\nrealistic load profiles, providing valuable insight for the design of\nappropriate mechanisms and incentives.\n

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