2014/05/26 by Wei Huang, Huang, Wei, Jian Lou +3
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #cs.GT #cs.MA
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1405.6573
IJCAI-2013 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling
arxiv created 2014/05/26 · openalex publication_date 2014/05/26 · arxiv updated 2014/05/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible items under price rigidities. We propose a polynomial algorithm that can be used to find over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrained Walrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of sellers' expected profits and items' expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits.