2025/01/23 by Benjamin Fish, Fish, Benjamin, Diptangshu Sen +3 · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #cs.CY #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.07792
openalex publication_date 2025/01/23 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
Decision-makers in high-stakes selection processes often face a fundamental choice: whether to make decisions themselves or to delegate authority to another entity whose incentives may only be partially aligned with their own. Such delegation arises naturally in settings like graduate admissions, hiring, or promotion, where a principal (e.g. a professor or worker) either reviews applicants personally or decisions are delegated to an agent (e.g. a committee or boss) that evaluates applicants efficiently, but according to a potentially misaligned objective. We study this trade-off in a stylized selection model with noisy signals. The principal incurs a cost for selecting applicants, but can evaluate applicants based on their fit with a project, team, workplace, etc. In contrast, the agent evaluates applicants solely on the basis of a signal that correlates with the principal's metric, but this comes at no cost to the principal. Our goal is to characterize when delegation is beneficial versus when decision-making should remain with the principal. We compare these regimes along three dimensions: (i) the principal's utility, (ii) the quality of the selected applicants according to the principal's metric, and (iii) the fairness of selection outcomes under disparate signal qualities.