2020/09/09 by Délia Coculescu, Delia Coculescu, Coculescu, Delia +2 · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Mathematical Finance (q-fin.MF) #q-fin.MF
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.04408
25 pages
arxiv created 2020/09/09 · openalex publication_date 2020/09/09 · arxiv updated 2020/09/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions.