A Model for Tax Evasion with Some Realistic Properties

2015/08/11 by Richard Vale, Vale, Richard · 1 citation
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Taxation and Avoidance #FOS: Economics and business #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #General Economics (econ.GN) #Taxation and Compliance Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1508.02476

openalex publication_date 2015/08/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We present a discrete-time dynamic model of income tax evasion. The model is solved exactly in the case of a single taxpayer and shown to have some realistic properties, including avoiding the Yitzhaki paradox. The extension to an agent-based model with a network of taxpayers is also investigated.

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