2018/10/12 by Yasha Savelyev, Savelyev, Yasha
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Cognitive Computing and Networks #Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #History and Philosophy of Physics (physics.hist-ph) #Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO) #Quantum Mechanics and Applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.06985
openalex publication_date 2018/10/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We revisit the question (most famously) initiated by Turing: can human intelligence be completely modeled by a Turing machine? We show that the answer is no, assuming a certain weak soundness hypothesis. More specifically we show that at least some meaningful thought processes of the brain cannot be Turing computable. In particular some physical processes are not Turing computable, which is not entirely expected. There are some similarities of our argument with the well known Lucas-Penrose argument, but we work purely on the level of Turing machines, and do not use Gödel's incompleteness theorem or any direct analogue. Instead we construct directly and use a weak analogue of a Gödel statement for a certain system which involves our human, this allows us to side-step some (possible) meta-logical issues with their argument.