2020/10/07 by Darío Blanco-Fernández, Blanco-Fernandez, Dario, Stephan Leitner +3
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #General Economics (econ.GN)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.03371
openalex publication_date 2020/10/07 · openalex created_date 2022/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Decision makers are often confronted with complex tasks which cannot be\nsolved by an individual alone, but require collaboration in the form of a\ncoalition. Previous literature argues that instability, in terms of the\nre-organization of a coalition with respect to its members over time, is\ndetrimental to performance. Other lines of research, such as the dynamic\ncapabilities framework, challenge this view. Our objective is to understand the\neffects of instability on the performance of coalitions which are formed to\nsolve complex tasks. In order to do so, we adapt the NK-model to the context of\nhuman decision-making in coalitions, and introduce an auction-based mechanism\nfor autonomous coalition formation and a learning mechanism for human agents.\nPreliminary results suggest that re-organizing innovative and well-performing\nteams is beneficial, but that this is true only in certain situations.\n