2021/03/03 by Sandip Ghosal, Ghosal, Sandip, R. K. Shyamasundar +1
Computer Science · #Advanced Malware Detection Techniques #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #Distributed systems and fault tolerance #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Programming Languages (cs.PL) #Security and Verification in Computing
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.02171
openalex publication_date 2021/03/03 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Realizing flow security in a concurrent environment is extremely challenging, primarily due to non-deterministic nature of execution. The difficulty is further exacerbated from a security angle if sequential threads disclose control locations through publicly observable statements like print, sleep, delay, etc. Such observations lead to internal and external timing attacks. Inspired by previous works that use classical Hoare style proof systems for establishing correctness of distributed (real-time) programs, in this paper, we describe a method for finding information leaks in concurrent programs through the introduction of leaky assertions at observable program points. Specifying leaky assertions akin to classic assertions, we demonstrate how information leaks can be detected in a concurrent context. To our knowledge, this is the first such work that enables integration of different notions of non-interference used in functional and security context. While the approach is sound and relatively complete in the classic sense, it enables the use of algorithmic techniques that enable programmers to come up with leaky assertions that enable checking for information leaks in sensitive applications.