2024/10/26 by Brunninger, Lukas, Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus, Gugler, Klaus +1
#Energy Policy #Gas Price Brake #Incumbents #Moral Hazard
paper · doi:10.57938/fb526200-750c-4f50-b987-ea8ecebdac17
In the aftermath of the Russian invasion in Ukraine and rising gas prices, the “gas Price brake” was implemented in Germany. We employ a difference-in-differences Approach and analyze data on offered gas contracts from two countries with comparable gas markets, where one country (Germany) has implemented the gas price brake and the other (Austria) has not. Our findings support the theoretical prediction, indicating that the gas price brake led to an increase in total annual gas costs in Germany. This increase is entirely attributable to incumbents increasing counterfactual gas prices by up to 90%. Non-incumbents do not ’milk‘ the brake.