Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators

2023/08/05 by Mamageishvili, Akaki, Felten, Edward W. · 3 citations
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.02880

Abstract

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for validators.

Cited by

• (Im)possibility of Incentive Design for Challenge-based Blockchain Protocols
• Depermissioning Web3: a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol for Blockchain Networks
• Looking for Attention: Randomized Attention Test Design for Validator Monitoring in Optimistic Rollups

Related

• Looking for Attention: Randomized Attention Test Design for Validator Monitoring in Optimistic Rollups
• Games in Public Announcement: How to Reduce System Losses in Optimistic Blockchain Mechanisms
• Hollow Victory: How Malicious Proposers Exploit Validator Incentives in Optimistic Rollup Dispute Games
• Incentive Non-Compatibility of Optimistic Rollups
• Creating incentives to prevent execution failures: an extension of VCG mechanism