2019/05/11 by Arunabh Saxena, Bhumesh Kumar, Saxena, Arunabh +7
Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Game Theory and Applications #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI) #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1905.04448
openalex publication_date 2019/05/11 · openalex created_date 2022/07/29 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this work, we focus on strategies to influence the opinion dynamics of a\nwell-connected society. We propose a generalization of the popular voter model.\nThis variant of the voter model can capture a wide range of individuals\nincluding strong-willed individuals whose opinion evolution is independent of\ntheir neighbors as well as conformist/rebel individuals who tend to adopt the\nopinion of the majority/minority. Motivated by political campaigns which aim to\ninfluence opinion dynamics by the end of a fixed deadline, we focus on\ninfluencing strategies for finite time horizons. We characterize the nature of\noptimal influencing strategies as a function of the nature of individuals\nforming the society. Using this, we show that for a society consisting of\npredominantly strong-willed/rebel individuals, the optimal strategy is to\ninfluence towards the end of the finite time horizon, whereas, for a society\npredominantly consisting of conformist individuals who try to adopt the opinion\nof the majority, it could be optimal to influence in the initial phase of the\nfinite time horizon.\n