2020/06/20 by Lu An, Aranya Chakrabortty, An, Lu +3 · 1 citation
Engineering · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Electrical engineering #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis #Optimal Power Flow Distribution #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.11665
openalex publication_date 2020/06/20 · openalex created_date 2022/07/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power\nsystem. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system\ncovertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is\nreduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse. The defender, or\nthe system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning the\nreactive power injection to the grid by switching on control devices, such as a\nbank of shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is proposed to\nfind a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) of the game, which saves the\nplayers' costs while providing the optimal allocation of both players'\ninvestment resources under budget and covertness constraints. We analyze the\nproposed game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and present an\nexample of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus power system model. It is\ndemonstrated that the defender is able to maintain system stability unless its\nsecurity budget is much lower than the attacker's budget.\n