2018/11/05 by Naumov, Pavel, Tao, Jia
#Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO)
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1811.02446
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.