2025/05/29 by S. S. Zhu, Zhu, Shenzhe, Jiao Jiao Sun +9 · 8 citations
Decision Sciences · #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Auction Theory and Applications #Computation and Language (cs.CL) #Computers and Society (cs.CY) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC) #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.00073
openalex publication_date 2025/05/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/16 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.