Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods

2021/05/06 by Yeon‐Koo Che, Che, Yeon-Koo, Weijie Zhong +1 · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · Business, Management and Accounting · #Economic theories and models #Auction Theory and Applications #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2105.02828

Abstract

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an "ambiguity" set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling, which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases.

Cited by

• Robust Optimality of Bundling Goods Beyond Finite Variance
• Uncharted Waters: Selling a New Product Robustly

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