Efficient Nash Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded\n Influence

2012/12/12 by Michael Kearns, Yishay Mansour, Kearns, Michael +1 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Applications #Economic theories and models #Economic Policies and Impacts

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1301.0577

Abstract

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each\nplayer s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise\nbe arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS\ncongestion games IN a natural way.Our main results are provably correct AND\nefficient algorithms FOR computing AND learning approximate Nash equilibria IN\nthis general framework.\n

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