2024/10/18 by Shuai Zhao, Zhao, Shuai, Xiaobao Wu +9 · 12 citations
Computer Science · #Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Computation and Language (cs.CL) #Cryptography and Data Security #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2410.14425
openalex publication_date 2024/10/18 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) can bridge the gap between large language models (LLMs) and downstream tasks. However, PEFT has been proven vulnerable to malicious attacks. Research indicates that poisoned LLMs, even after PEFT, retain the capability to activate internalized backdoors when input samples contain predefined triggers. In this paper, we introduce a novel weak-to-strong unlearning algorithm to defend against backdoor attacks based on feature alignment knowledge distillation, named W2SDefense. Specifically, we first train a small-scale language model through full-parameter fine-tuning to serve as the clean teacher model. Then, this teacher model guides the large-scale poisoned student model in unlearning the backdoor, leveraging PEFT. Theoretical analysis suggests that W2SDefense has the potential to enhance the student model's ability to unlearn backdoor features, preventing the activation of the backdoor. We conduct comprehensive experiments on three state-of-the-art large language models and several different backdoor attack algorithms. Our empirical results demonstrate the outstanding performance of W2SDefense in defending against backdoor attacks without compromising model performance.