2023/02/17 by Zhijian, Wang · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems (nlin.AO) #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Economics and business #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2302.09131
openalex publication_date 2023/02/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
People choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. The process can be modelled as an evolutionary game dynamics system, which may be controllable. In modern control theory, eigenvalue (pole) assignment is a basic approach to designing a full-state feedback controller, which can influence the outcome of a game. This study shows that, in a game with two Nash equilibria, the long-running strategy distribution can be controlled by pole assignment. We illustrate a theoretical workflow to design and evaluate the controller. To our knowledge, this is the first realisation of the control of equilibrium selection by design in the game dynamics theory paradigm. We hope the controller can be verified in a laboratory human subject game experiment.