A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation

2022/04/08 by Jian Low, Chen Hajaj, Low, Jian +3
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2204.04251

openalex publication_date 2022/04/08 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game.

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