2024/11/13 by Hanti Lin, Lin, Hanti
Arts and Humanities · Computer Science · #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Methodology (stat.ME) #Other Statistics (stat.OT) #Philosophy and History of Science
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.08547
openalex publication_date 2024/11/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
There has long been an impression that reliabilism implies externalism and that frequentist statistics, due to its reliabilist nature, is inherently externalist. I argue, however, that frequentist statistics can plausibly be understood as a form of internalist reliabilism -- internalist in the conventional sense, yet reliabilist in certain unconventional and intriguing ways. Crucially, in developing the thesis that reliabilism does not imply externalism, my aim is not to stretch the meaning of `reliabilism' merely to sever the implication. Instead, it is to gain a deeper understanding of frequentist statistics, which stands as one of the most sustained attempts by scientists to develop an epistemology for their own use.