Conditional Disclosure as a Coordination Device

2026/04/01 by Matthew Cashman · 1 citation
#econ.GN #q-fin.EC

paper · pdf

Abstract

People with controversial views may stay silent rather than speak out alone, though in a large enough group they could speak safely together. A social assurance contract makes disclosure conditional: signed commitments of support stay private until enough people have signed for it to be safe to publish. In contrast, a survey can measure hidden support but cannot protect anyone who acts on it. I derive the contract's exact advantage over speaking openly - and when that advantage disappears: it can turn a few people who would speak alone into a larger coalition.

Citations

• Failure Privacy and Safe Collective Expression with Social Assurance Contracts
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

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• Failure Privacy and Safe Collective Expression with Social Assurance Contracts

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