2019/09/27 by Wei Li, Li, Wei, Shengmei Zhao +1
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1909.12584
openalex publication_date 2019/09/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source loopholes and detection loopholes, channel attacks are considered to be the main ways of information leakage, while collective attacks are considered to be the most powerful active channel attacks. Here we deduce in detail the capability limit of Eve's collective attack in non-entangled quantum key distribution, like BB84 and measurement-device-independent protocols, and entangled quantum key distribution, like device-independent protocol, in which collective attack is composed of quantum weak measurement and quantum unambiguous state discrimination detection. The theoretical results show that collective attacks are equivalent in entangled and non-entangled quantum key distribution protocols. We also find that compared with the security proof based on entanglement purification, the security proof based on collective attack not only improves the system's tolerable bit error rate, but also improves the key rate.