International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

2000/12/01 by Beth A. Simmons · 699 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Business #Commit #Compliance (psychology) #Corruption and Economic Development #Economics #Enforcement #International Arbitration and Investment Law #International Development and Aid #International law #Law #Law and economics #Political science #Reputation #Social psychology #Sovereignty #State (computer science)

paper · open access · doi:10.2307/2586210

published in American Political Science Review 94(4), 819-835 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 2000/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely “enforcement” mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.

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