Seniority in Legislatures

1992/12/01 by Richard D. McKelvey, Raymond Riezman · 4 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Sports Analytics and Performance #Electoral Systems and Political Participation

paper · doi:10.2307/1964347

Abstract

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

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