2024/10/07 by Xiaoyu Cheng, Cheng, Xiaoyu, Peter Klibanoff +5 · 1 citation
Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Economics and business #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2410.05504
openalex publication_date 2024/10/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment. Some experiments in the collection must be Pareto-ranked in that both players agree on their payoff ranking. If an optimal Bayesian persuasion experiment can be split in this way, then any not-too-ambiguity-averse sender as well as the receiver benefit. There are no benefits when the receiver has only two actions.