Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

2007/05/01 by LILY L. TSAI, Lily L. Tsai · 597 citations
Social Sciences · #Accountability #Authoritarianism #Bureaucracy #Business #China #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Democracy #Economics #Government (linguistics) #Law #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Local government #Political science #Politics #Public administration #Public good

paper · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070153

published in American Political Science Review 101(2), 355-372 (Cambridge University Press)

openalex publication_date 2007/05/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Abstract

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

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