2021/09/27 by ALEXANDER FOUIRNAIES, Alexander Fouirnaies, ANDREW B. HALL +1 · 85 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Affect (linguistics) #Democracy #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Gender Politics and Representation #Ideology #Incentive #Law #Legislation #Legislator #Legislature #Microeconomics #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Psychology #Public administration #Public economics #Roll call #Salience (neuroscience) #Situational ethics #Social psychology #State (computer science) #Voting
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s0003055421001064
published in American Political Science Review 116(2), 662-676 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2021/09/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
A classic question about democratic elections is how much they are able to influence politician behavior by forcing them to anticipate future reelection attempts, especially in contexts where voters are not paying close attention and are not well informed. We compile a new dataset containing roughly 780,000 bills, combined with more than 16 million roll-call voting records for roughly 6,000 legislators serving in U.S. state legislatures with term limits. Using an individual-level difference-in-differences design, we find that legislators who can no longer seek reelection sponsor fewer bills, are less productive on committees, and are absent for more floor votes, on average. Building a new dataset of roll-call votes and interest-group ratings, we find little evidence that legislators who cannot run for reelection systematically shift their ideological platforms. In sum, elections appear to influence how legislators allocate their effort in important ways even in low-salience environments but may have less influence on ideological positioning.